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Abstract
Public expenditure reform must be underpinned by some understanding of
the time-series properties of public expenditure. This paper examines the
univariate properties  of aggregate revenue expenditure at the level of State
governments in India over the period 1974-98 for three states: Punjab, Haryana
and Maharashtra.  The empirical exercise is performed on the logarithmic
transformation of aggregate revenue expenditure in terms of nominal (rather than
ex post real) expenditure, not normalised to State Domestic Product, for reasons
justified in the paper, and is confined to the aggregate for lack of a breakdown of
the series by economic classification. The data are adjusted for notional entries
and other distortionary budgetary practices. There is trend stationarity in Punjab
and Haryana, with a deterministic trend growth rate of 16-17 per cent, and clear
evidence thereby of fiscal smoothing in the presence of periodic upward shocks
of Pay Commission or other origin.  In Maharashtra by contrast, aggregate
expenditure carries a unit root, with no deterministic trend, and no drift term;
expenditure shocks of other than Pay Commission origin appear to have been
enabled with no corresponding smoothing, but there is sharp and concurrent
smoothing at the time of the Pay Commission shocks, such that aggregate
expenditure does not show a spike.  The issue of whether the fiscal smoothing in
each case was unproductive or productive remains unrevealed in the aggregate
figures.
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TIME-SERIES PROPERTIES OF STATE-LEVEL
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
I. Introduction
Public expenditure reform is a necessary element of all fiscal reform, but
must clearly be underpinned by some understanding of the time-series properties
of public expenditure. This paper models public expenditure at the level of State
governments in India as a univariate process, as a first step in that direction.
The empirical exercise is confined to three states: Punjab, Haryana and
Maharashtra. Reported state-level expenditures are subject to spikes resulting
from episodic notional accounting entries, with accompanying notional revenue
entries, or other distortionary practices. Knowledge of these requires some
measure of immersion in the budgetary practices of each state. Prior fiscal
studies by the authors
1 yielded insider information of this kind only for the three
states selected. The data series for all three covers the period 1974-98, yielding
25 (annual) observations for each. A discontinuity in the reporting format on
state-level finances in 1974 made it impossible to carry back the series to earlier
years. This may not be as much of a disadvantage as might appear to be the
case at first sight. A long time-series constructed by Rajaraman-Mukhopadhyay,
1999, for consolidated (Centre plus States) public domestic debt as a percent of
GDP shows a structural break in the slope in 1974,
2 with a positive slope in
debt/GDP subsequent to 1974. The oil price hike of 1973 is a universal structural
break in economic time series,
3 supplemented by the Third Pay Commission
salary hike for government employees, implemented in 1973.
                                           
1  Rajaraman, et.al 1999;  Sen and Rao, 2000; NIPFP, 2000.
2  This break was exogenously imposed, but tested for statistical significance within the
framework of structural time-series models; see Rajaraman and Mukhopadhyay, 1999.
3  See for example Perron, 1989; by inserting structural breaks in 1929 and 1973 where
Nelson-Plosser, 1982, did not, their finding of a unit root was rejected for all but a few (U.S.)3
Section II reviews the surprisingly thin empirical literature on time-series
properties of public expenditure. Section III describes the public expenditure
determination process, and justifies performance of the analysis in terms of
nominal rather than realised (ex post) real expenditure. The exercise is
performed only on aggregate revenue (current) expenditure. There is prior
evidence that capital expenditure is an accommodative component that is
compressed at times of fiscal stress (Rajaraman et.al., 2000). In terms of priors,
therefore, total expenditure may exhibit stationarity, where revenue expenditure
might not. Disaggregation possibilities within revenue expenditure, as obtainable
from budgetary data, permit breakdowns by functional (departmental) category
alone. A breakdown by economic category (wages and salaries, purchases of
goods) would have enabled a meaningful exploration at disaggregated level, but
these are not systematically available in published form.
Section IV describes the adjustments made to the raw data for each state.
Section V reports the specifications used and the findings, with details of test
results in Appendices I (Punjab), II(Haryana), and III(Maharashtra). Section VI
presents the conclusions in terms of implications for public expenditure reform.
II. Review of Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on the time series properties
of public expenditure is sparse. Ashworth, 1995, tests the null hypothesis of a
unit root in real government expenditure in the United Kingdom, and fails to reject
the null. Likewise Afxentiou, et.al, 1999, find the presence of a unit root in real
per capita federal and provincial government expenditure in Canada. There is an
empirical literature that tests Wagner's Law,  which states that the share of
government expenditure in total output increases as real per capita income
grows. Of these, two (Ansari, et.al., 1997; Chletsos and Kollias, 1997) examine
the time series properties of real government expenditure in per capita terms.
The first finds that real per capita government expenditure is non-stationary (I(1))
                                                                                                                                 
economic time series. However, the imposition of exogenous breaks has been criticised as
methodologically unsound by Christiano, 1992 and others.4
in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. A similar finding is reported in the second
study for Greece. It is, however, not clear in either case whether or not the tests
reject trend-stationarity in favour of difference-stationarity. Other studies testing
for Wagner's Law (Amey and Ashworth, 1993; Murthy, 1993; Oxley, 1994;
Anwar, et.al, 1996; Bohl, 1996) look at the time series properties of the share of
government expenditure in GDP. Of these, the results of Anwar, et.al, 1996, who
report for a large number of countries including India, are summarised in Table 1.
No clear pattern emerges from their results, but what is of interest is that public
expenditure/GDP for India is found to be I(0), i.e. stationary.
III. The Expenditure Process
This exercise models actual aggregate public expenditure on the revenue
(current) account, as reported at the conclusion of each fiscal year, which is the
final realised outcome of the budgeted projected expenditure for the year. The
budgeted estimate (B.E.) is an aggregation of the projected requirements of the
different functional departments, after pruning by a central finance department,
often augmented by one or more supplementary "demands for grants" during the
course of the year. The final expenditure outcome obtains after further pruning in
accordance with actual fund flows from the finance department to the spending
departments. This second pruning may result either in expenditure carry-overs
into the next fiscal year, which would then be merged with the B.E. for the next
year, or by truncation of expenditure programmes. In some cases the reverse
might happen, with actual expenditure falling short of funds provided, for any of a
number of reasons, including procedural obstacles to expenditure. Revenue
expenditure has two components: non-plan (committed expenditures from
schemes initiated during past quinquennial plans); and plan (new schemes
during the on-going quinquennial plan). This paper ignores the plan-nonplan
distinction, and looks at total expenditure aggregating across the two.5
Expected inflation enters into the budgetary process formally only in the
dearness allowance (D.A.) component of wages and salaries, uniformly across
departments. The D.A. is a salary add-on linked to the Consumer Price Index
relevant to the region/class of employee. It amounts to a form of partial inflation
indexation and is not necessarily concurrently paid; D.A. is often paid in the form
of bunched arrears. Indeed, it is the lack of full inflation indexation that motivates
the periodic upgradation of wage/salary scales by Central Pay Commissions.
Once adopted by the Central government, the adoption of these, or in some
cases enhanced, scales by State governments is  routine. Other expenditure
components are not formally indexed, although clearly departmental budgetary
expenditure claims would be underpinned by some kind of expectation formation
mechanism regarding inflation, most likely adaptive with a one-period lag. The
supplementary grants and expenditure pruning process together determine the
adjustment to actual inflation, and thus the real ex-post expenditure outcome.
However, the process does not either explicitly target or protect real expenditure.
Further, expenditure reform is posed in terms of nominal absolutes. The
exercise here is thus confined to the nominal series, and is confined also to
aggregate expenditure for lack of data on components by economic category.
4
Further, the series is not normalised with respect to State-level Domestic
Product. State-level estimates of domestic product are available only at factor
cost, carry an unknown noise element, but most importantly are available only
with a considerable time lag, so that observations for recent years would thereby
needlessly be excluded.
                                           
4  The sole exception to this is interest, on which information is routinely  provided in
budgetary data. Interest follows a known recursive growth dynamic over time, as a function of
previous accumulations of state-level public debt, reduced in the case of Punjab state by waivers
on debt and interest owed to the Central government. These waivers were justified by the Central
government on the grounds that the cost of battling terrorism in the state must be nationally
borne.6
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Time Series Properties of the Share of


























              Source: Anwar, et.al. (1996).
      Note:     Government expenditure refers to general
          government that includes Centre, States
                                          and local governments.
IV. Data Adjustments
Reported and adjusted revenue expenditure in Punjab are shown in figure
1. The components causing the spikes in revenue expenditure, shown in figure 2,
were expenditure on state lotteries (in 1994-95 and 1995-96) and on the subsidy
to the Punjab State Electricity Board (in 1991-92). In both cases, there were7
accompanying revenue spikes. In the lotteries case, a brief experiment in 1994-
96 with single-digit lotteries sharply raised both collections and pay-outs. In the
PSEB case, there was a bunched book adjustment of the annual subsidy due to
the PSEB
5 but not paid over a number of years because it was set-off against
interest dues from the PSEB. The accumulated subsidy was routed through the
budget in 1991-92, against a corresponding notional interest receipt.
6 As can be
seen from figure 2, each spike is very sharp, adding as it does additional
expenditures of the order of Rs 1500 crores, equivalent to an increase of
between a third and a half of normal expenditure.
Figure 3 shows the annual growth rate of adjusted (nominal) revenue
expenditure in Punjab. Three spikes in the growth rate are clearly observable: in
1975-76, the very first data point; in 1987-88; and again in 1996-97.  These
spikes corresponds to implementation of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Pay
Commission scales of pay (the Fifth Pay Commission was implemented with
effect from 1 January 1996, but actual payments with arrears were made only
starting January 1998 so that the spike in 1996-97 is surprising; it is possible
however, that accounting adjustments were made to backdate arrears due so
that the expenditure in the year of actual payment did not bunch alarmingly).
Annual growth rates of expenditure in these years rose to more than 30 percent,
from a mean level of approximately 15 percent. What is of interest is that these
are spikes precisely because the rate of growth comes down in the next period
very sharply to a below average rate.
Reported and adjusted revenue expenditure in Haryana  are shown in
figure 4. The adjustments required occur in the period 1994-99 on account of two
components: rural electrification subsidy and lotteries. The corresponding spikes
on the receipts side are interest receipts/repayments of loans from HSEB and
receipts from lotteries. There is a periodic notional routing of interest arrears from
                                           
5  Since April 1977, to cover the operating losses of PSEB on account of rural
electrification; for details see Rajaraman et.al. 1999.
6  Another such episode was observable in the RE for 1996-97, but not in the actual figures
for the year, perhaps because of an ongoing dispute over the amount of subsidy payable; see
Rajaraman et.al. 1999: 27.8
HSEB against the rural electrification subsidy payable exactly as in the case of
Punjab. Again, like Punjab, Haryana experimented with single digit lotteries,
which resulted in large receipts and large lottery payments during 1994-99. The
growth rate spikes (figure 5) in the case of Haryana, however, show expenditure
surges in addition to those originating from Pay Commissions alone, principally in
1980-81 and 1994-95, arising from an assortment of departmental components.
7
In the case of Maharashtra, the state has a number of schemes carrying
reserve funds with dedicated receipts, like the Employment Guarantee Scheme
which has five dedicated cesses. Receipts from these cesses are shown as
revenue receipts, with  corresponding automatic expenditure entries, showing
transfer of an equivalent amount to the reserve fund. When actual expenditures
are incurred, these are shown as financed through withdrawals from the reserve
fund. If in each year, transfers to and withdrawals from these funds were of
matching dimensions, the above practice would not introduce any distortions.
However, if there is a net positive transfer to the reserve fund, the accounting
convention followed shows reported expenditure higher than actual expenditure.
In order to correct for this problem, reported expenditures in the case of
Maharashtra have been adjusted to exclude net transfers to reserve funds. There
is a growing divergence between reported and adjusted expenditure (figure 6) in
the nineties, with adjusted expenditure systematically below reported
expenditure, showing that there has been a growing absolute net transfer to
reserve funds during this decade.
The growth rates in adjusted expenditure for Maharashtra (figure 7) are
very different from those for Punjab and Haryana. There are no marked spikes
corresponding to implementation of the Pay Commission scales (except for a
starting spike in 1975-76). Instead, there are other sharp spikes, in 1978-79, and
again in 1981-82, financed by major withdrawal from rural development funds.
                                           
7  In 1980-81 on account of expenditure surges in interest payments, and education and
police departments; in 1994-95, in irrigation, water supply and social security.9


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































V. Specifications and Findings
The budgetary process for any forthcoming fiscal year, as described in
section II, is predicated on expenditure actuals in the previous year, with no
referential carryback to previous years. Therefore, the first tested specification
models nominal expenditure levels in logs as an  AR(1) process, with both a
constant drift and a trend term, and no higher-order lag terms.
ln yt =    ? ln yt-1  + c   +  ßt  + et ; et ~  NID (0,s
2
e)       …. (1a)
If ¦?¦ < 1,  ln yt is stationary in levels.
If     ?  = 1,  ln yt is non-stationary in levels and stationary in first differences.
Thus, stationarity in the series can be determined by testing the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the series against a one-sided alternative (since ?>1
is implausible for a public expenditure series, even in India):
H0 :  ? = 1
H1 : ¦?¦ < 1
The specification is transformed for testing into the following form:
  ? ln yt  =   ? ln yt-1  +  c  +  ßt  +  et ; et ~  NID (0,s
2
e)         …. (1b)
where
? =  ? - 1
H0 :   ? = 0
H1 :   ? < 013
When an LM test on specification (1b) showed serial correlation in the
residuals, an augmented form of the tested specification was tried with upto four
lags, thus:
      4
  ? ln yt  =   ? ln yt-1  +  c  +  ßt  +  et  +  S   ai  ? ln yt-i ;   et ~  NID (0,s
2
e) …(2)
     i=1
If the tests decisively rejected the null of a unit root and showed the series
to be trend stationary, a simple time-trend was estimated on ln yt.
Findings for Punjab are presented in Appendix I.  With specification (1b)
and no lag terms, the null hypothesis of a unit root (?=0, corresponding to ?=1)
was not rejected using McKinnon critical values at the 1 or 5 percent levels, but
was rejected at the 10 percent level. An LM test showed second-order serial
correlation in the residuals upto two lags (F=4.50; P=.025), suggesting the need
for an augmented specification with lags (equation 2).  It is this form which is
reported in table I.1. This time, the ADF test statistic falls decisively below the
critical values for rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root even at the 10
percent level. The coefficients of all the lag terms  (except at the first lag) are
significant at P=0.10, especially at the fourth lag. Therefore all four lags need to
be retained in the specification, and an LM test on the residuals showed no
further serial correlation (F=0.51; P=.61). The presence of the trend term
necessitated a redundant variable test as follows:
H0 :  ? =  ß = 0
H1 :  ? ? ß ? 0
The value of F = 8.49 is higher than the critical value (7.24) for rejection of the
null (unit root with no trend) at 5 percent, but below the critical value (10.61) for
rejection at 1 percent.
Thus the redundant variable test affirms (at 5 percent) the presence of a
non-zero deterministic trend (ß?0). Where there is a deterministic trend, the14
critical values to be applied revert back to the standard normal, and with that the
null of a unit root stands decisively rejected (see table I.1).
8
Thus, the nominal expenditure series for Punjab in logs is a trend
stationary series. Estimating a simple time-trend on ln yt yielded a trend of 0.153,
with a DW statistic of 1.39 showing serial correlation in the residuals (table I.2).
The residuals are graphed.
Findings for Haryana are presented in Appendix II.  With specification (1b)
and no lag terms (table II.1), the null hypothesis of a unit root (?=0,
corresponding to ?=1) was not rejected using McKinnon critical values at the 1 or
5 percent levels, exactly as in the case of Punjab. An LM test showed no residual
serial correlation, either first or second order (F=0.98; P=0.33 for first-order serial
correlation, and F=0.65; P=0.53 for second-order serial correlation), Thus, there
was no need for augmented specification (2). The statistical significance of the
trend coefficient was tested with the redundant variable test. The F-statistic
(6.24) is higher than the critical value at 10 percent but not at 1 or 5 percent.
Accepting the presence of a deterministic trend at the 10 percent level of
significance, the critical values to be applied revert back to the standard normal,
and with that the null of a unit root stands decisively rejected, as in the case of
Punjab.  A simple time-trend on ln yt yielded a trend of 0.149 (table II.2), with a
DW statistic of 1.53 showing serial correlation in the residuals, exactly as in the
case of Punjab.
Findings for Maharashtra are presented in Appendix III. Specification (1b)
with no lag terms is reported in table III.1; the LM test showed absence of serial
correlation upto two lags (F=0.11; P=0.74 for first-order serial correlation, and
F=0.22; P=0.80 for second-order serial correlation), thus ruling out the need for
further augmentation.  The t-statistics for the constant (drift) and trend terms are
                                           
8  Enders, 1995: 257.15
Table 2
Summary of Stationarity Test Results
Punjab Haryana Maharashtra (a)
Dependent Variable ?log (rev exp) ?log (rev exp) ?log (rev exp) Dlog
Constant Yes Yes No Yes
Trend Yes Yes No No
t-stat: log(revexp(t-1)) -2.56 -3.46 11.1 -4.83
Critical Value Std. Normal Std. Normal Mackinnon: -2.66 Std. Normal
Serial Correlation : F
(first order)
1.27 (p=0.27) 0.98 (p=0.33) 0.11 (p=0.74) 2.11 (p=0.16)
Serial Correlation : F
(second order)
4.50 (p=0.02) 0.65 (p=0.53) 0.22 (p=0.80) 1.78 (p=0.19)
Lag length 4 -- --
Finding Trend stationary Trend stationary Not stationary I(1) Stationary
Trend growth rate 16.5% 16.1% -
Notes:  1. Serial Correlation refers to the LM test.
2.  The Mackinnon critical value is for the 1% level of significance.
3. 16
so low with respect to conventional critical values, that further testing for
presence of the constant and trend terms was not done.
Table III.2 shows that the ADF test convincingly fails to reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root even at the  1 percent level of significance. This
establishes that the log of revenue expenditure in Maharashtra is difference
stationary. Thus, the result for Maharashtra is very different from those for
Punjab and Haryana, where the null of a unit root was decisively rejected.
Finally, to test the order of integration for Maharashtra, the unit root test
was carried out on the first difference of the log of revenue expenditure (table
III.3). The null of a unit root is decisively rejected even at 1 percent level. An LM
test on the residuals shows no serial correlation upto two lags (F=2.11; P=0.16
and F=1.78; P=0.19) for first and second-order correlation. Thus revenue
expenditure in Maharashtra is an I(1) series.
The findings for all three states are summarised in table 2.
VI. Conclusions
This paper examines the time-series properties of public expenditure at
the level of sub-national State governments in India. Three states are studied:
Punjab, Haryana and Maharashtra. Reported state-level expenditures suffer from
episodic notional accounting entries, with matching notional revenue entries, or
other distortionary budgetary practices, which call for some measure of inside
information so as to obtain an adjusted series that reflects actual expenditure.
The authors had knowledge of budgetary practices only for the three selected
states.
Contrary to other studies of public expenditure, this exercise examines the
time-series properties of state-level revenue expenditure in (the logarithmic
transformation of) nominal values, on the grounds that the expenditure
generation process neither targets real (ex ante) values, nor protects real (ex17
post) expenditure. The single exception to the absence of real ex post protection
is the dearness allowance (DA) component of wages and salaries, an add-on
linked to the Consumer Price Index which constitutes a form of partial, and not
always concurrent, indexation.  The paper examines nominal absolutes, not
normalised to state-level domestic product, because of the noise element in sub-
national domestic product estimates.
All three states experienced exogenous expenditure shocks, with
implementation of the third, fourth and fifth Pay Commission salary hikes in 1973
(just prior to the start of the data series); in 1986; and in 1997 respectively. These
were shocks in the wages and salaries component alone, but in the case of
Punjab and Haryana cause visible spikes in aggregate revenue expenditure
growth rates. Haryana has spikes of other origin as well.  In Maharashtra on the
other hand the Pay Commission spikes are not visible at all in growth rates of
aggregate revenue expenditure. Instead, there are other spikes caused by large
expenditures on particular programmes like the Employment Guarantee Scheme.
Had time-series data been obtainable on public expenditure by economic
categories,
9 priors in respect of the wages and salaries component are that it
would carry a unit root, by virtue of the lifetime security characteristic of public
employment contracts, with a drift imparted by a combination of the partial
inflation indexation built into governmental salaries and, more importantly, staff
growth over time. The wage/salary bill, yt, at time t, should have the following
form:
yt = y0 +  S  an dn +  ßt  + S et
  n                        t
where there are n Pay Commissions, and ß is the drift coefficient.
                                           
9  The average share of wages and salaries in total revenue expenditure during the period
1994-97, as calculated in an earlier study on Punjab (Rajaraman et.al., 1999), is 62.41 percent. A
matrix of economic by functional categories for Punjab shows a share of wages and salaries
ranging between a low of 23.0 per cent for social security and welfare, to highs of 87.1, 84.4 and
76.6 per cent in health, sanitation and education respectively. Corresponding figures for Haryana
and Maharashtra are not available.18
Thus, the finding in this paper of trend stationarity in aggregate
expenditure for Punjab and Haryana, in the presence of periodic upward shocks
in the wages and salary component, shows that there has been fiscal smoothing
through accommodation in the non-wage component. Within the non-wage
component, interest (in the absence of default) would have had its own upward
dynamic over time, as a result of both mounting (absolute) debt, and the lifting of
financial repression starting in the nineteen eighties, which raised interest rates
on government debt.
10 This suggests, but does not establish, that there might
have been downward compression in growth of nominal expenditure on the non-
salary non-interest residual for trend stationarity in aggregate revenue
expenditure to have been possible.  The deterministic trend rate of annual growth
in nominal absolute expenditure is estimated at 16.5 percent for Punjab, 16.1
percent for Haryana.
The Maharashtra results are different from those for Punjab and Haryana.
Aggregate revenue expenditure in Maharashtra carries a unit root, with no
deterministic trend, and with no drift term. Thus, the expenditure level in
Maharashtra at any time is the sum of stochastic disturbances in all preceding
periods, rather than being deterministically given as in Punjab and Haryana. The
memory of an expenditure spike is carried forward. This suggests that
Maharashtra had access to sources of financing which made it possible to fund
such expenditure spikes at least over the twenty-five years 1974-98. It must be
reiterated however that the Maharashtra (aggregate) series does not carry a drift.
The Pay Commission salary hikes are not visible as spikes in aggregate
expenditure for Maharashtra. Such spikes as are visible are of other than Pay
Commission origin. This suggests that in Maharashtra, there was very sharp and
concurrent fiscal smoothing at the time of the Pay Commission shocks, such that
aggregate expenditure did not show a spike, but that expenditure shocks of other
origin were enabled with no corresponding smoothing.
                                           
10  For the interest rate path on Central domestic debt, see Rajaraman-Mukhopadhyay,
2000: 218.19
Thus, the political economy of public expenditure management differs very
sharply between Punjab/Haryana on the one  hand, and Maharashtra on the
other.
What is of paramount importance is the nature of the fiscal smoothing in
each case, and this can clearly not stand revealed in aggregate expenditure.
Fiscal smoothing can be productive, if it originates in reduction of wasteful
expenditure. It can on the other hand be unproductive, if it originates in reduction
of growth-enhancing expenditures.
If fiscal smoothing has been achieved in these states unproductively, and
to the extent this smoothing has occurred in response to exogenous shocks of
Central government origin, state-level expenditure reform in the long-run will not
be possible without Central government leadership. It can be argued of course
that the upward drift in the wage/salary bill between Pay Commission revisions,
which is accounted for in part by net staff growth, falls entirely within the
discretionary latitude of state governments, but it is difficult to control the political
pressures to expand government employment when the relative attractions of
government service are periodically ratcheted up. Thus, even in respect of staff
growth, it is difficult for states to act unilaterally unless the Central government
sets an example by attaching staff growth conditionalities to adoption of
enhanced pay scales. If on the other hand the Pay Commission revisions are
seen as discrete corrections for the lack of complete and concurrent inflation
indexation in government salaries, then clearly the fiscal smoothing seen in all
three is a reflection of constraints imposed by low own tax buoyancies
(remarkably the same at 0.90 for all three states, as estimated over the period
1985-97).
11 This is in line with the finding of fiscal accommodation through capital
expenditure compression pointed out in an earlier study  for Punjab (Rajaraman
et.al., 2000).
                                           
11  Chand et.al., 2000: 29. However, estimates for earlier periods show higher buoyancies,
at 1.25 for the period 1980-87 for Maharashtra for example.20
There remains a great deal of room for unilateral public expenditure
reform at state-level, in the direction of improving procedures, and altering the
inter and intra-departmental allocations of expenditure and staff towards greater
productivity. Most importantly, there is a need for constructing outcome indicators
for each functional department so that the productivity of public expenditure
becomes objectively measurable.21
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Appendix I: Punjab
Table I.1
ADF Test Statistic -2.555402     1%   Critical Value* -4.5000
    5%   Critical Value -3.6591
   10%  Critical Value -3.2677
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LADJREVEX)
Sample(adjusted): 1979 1998
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LADJREVEX(-1) -0.921335 0.360544 -2.555402 0.0239
D(LADJREVEX(-1)) -0.580667 0.329775 -1.760798 0.1018
D(LADJREVEX(-2)) -0.943360 0.322491 -2.925229 0.0118
D(LADJREVEX(-3)) -0.797534 0.312003 -2.556177 0.0239
D(LADJREVEX(-4)) -0.419677 0.220533 -1.903017 0.0794
C 9.457912 3.465512 2.729153 0.0172
T 0.151139 0.056062 2.695916 0.0183
R-squared 0.751042     Mean dependent var 0.154000
Adjusted R-squared 0.636138     S.D. dependent var 0.071185
S.E. of regression 0.042940     Akaike info criterion -3.188821
Sum squared resid 0.023970     Schwarz criterion -2.840314
Log likelihood 38.88821     F-statistic 6.536272





Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.813900 0.024085 407.4710 0.0000
T 0.153269 0.001620 94.60328 0.0000
R-squared 0.997437     Mean dependent var 11.80640
Adjusted R-squared 0.997325     S.D. dependent var 1.129480
S.E. of regression 0.058414     Akaike info criterion -2.765888
Sum squared resid 0.078482     Schwarz criterion -2.668378
Log likelihood 36.57360     F-statistic 8949.780
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Appendix II: Haryana
Table II.1
ADF Test Statistic -3.460556     1%   Critical Value* -4.3942
    5%   Critical Value -3.6118
    10% Critical Value -3.2418
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LADJREVEX)
Sample(adjusted): 1975 1998
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LADJREVEX(-1) -0.799330 0.230983 -3.460556 0.0023
C 7.765469 2.205141 3.521530 0.0020
T 0.119734 0.034245 3.496337 0.0022
R-squared 0.372847     Mean dependent var 0.152942
Adjusted R-squared 0.313119     S.D. dependent var 0.081866
S.E. of regression 0.067849     Akaike info criterion -2.426590
Sum squared resid 0.096674     Schwarz criterion -2.279334
Log likelihood 32.11908     F-statistic 6.242338





Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.684760 0.025688 377.0222 0.0000
T 0.149207 0.001835 81.31981 0.0000
R-squared 0.996534     Mean dependent var 11.47525
Adjusted R-squared 0.996383     S.D. dependent var 1.100045
S.E. of regression 0.066155     Akaike info criterion -2.517000
Sum squared resid 0.100661     Schwarz criterion -2.419490
Log likelihood 33.46251     F-statistic 6612.912
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Appendix III: Maharashtra
Table III.1
ADF Test Statistic -1.480434     1%   Critical Value* -4.3942
    5%   Critical Value -3.6118
    10% Critical Value -3.2418
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LADJREVEX)
Sample(adjusted): 1975 1998
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LADJREVEX(-1) -0.233986 0.158052 -1.480434 0.1536
C 2.745287 1.745875 1.572442 0.1308
T 0.034135 0.023966 1.424322 0.1690
R-squared 0.114380     Mean dependent var 0.145249
Adjusted R-squared 0.030036     S.D. dependent var 0.059737
S.E. of regression 0.058833     Akaike info criterion -2.711742
Sum squared resid 0.072689     Schwarz criterion -2.564486
Log likelihood 35.54091     F-statistic 1.356107
Durbin-Watson stat 1.836085     Prob(F-statistic) 0.279316
Table III.2
ADF Test Statistic  11.21587     1%   Critical Value* -2.6649
    5%   Critical Value -1.9559
    10% Critical Value -1.6231
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Dependent Variable: D(LADJREVEX)
Sample(adjusted): 1975 1998
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LADJREVEX(-1) 0.011093 0.000989 11.21587 0.0000
R-squared -0.108153     Mean dependent var 0.145249
Adjusted R-squared -0.108153     S.D. dependent var 0.059737
S.E. of regression 0.062885     Akaike info criterion -2.654247
Sum squared resid 0.090954     Schwarz criterion -2.605161
Log likelihood 32.85096     Durbin-Watson stat 1.87581026
Table III.3
ADF Test Statistic -4.822294     1%   Critical Value* -3.7497
    5%   Critical Value -2.9969
    10% Critical Value -2.6381
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LADJREVEX,2)
Sample(adjusted): 1976 1998
Included observations: 23 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LADJREVEXM(-1)) -1.053924 0.218552 -4.822294 0.0001
C 0.151232 0.034687 4.359957 0.0003
R-squared 0.525472     Mean dependent var -0.004142
Adjusted R-squared 0.502876     S.D. dependent var 0.087380
S.E. of regression 0.061609     Akaike info criterion -2.653071
Sum squared resid 0.079709     Schwarz criterion -2.554332
Log likelihood 32.51032     F-statistic 23.25452
Durbin-Watson stat 1.717126     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000091